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ABSTRACT
Despite the burgeoning comparative literature on authoritarian elections, less is known
about the dynamics of competition in authoritarian subnational elections where
opposition is not allowed to organize into parties. Local elections without partisan
competition in single-party authoritarian regimes provide considerable advantages
to the incumbents and may well turn the incumbent advantage common in liberal
democracies into incumbent dominance. What economic factors can break
incumbent dominance in such competition without parties? With quantitative and
qualitative evidence from grassroots elections in China, this article illustrates that
economic growth and industrial economic structure offering more economic
autonomy help to break incumbent dominance and increase the prospects of
successful challenge to incumbency by non-party outsiders. The examination of the
findings in a broad context in China and against the backdrop of local
democratization in the developing world suggests that though we may observe
successful challenge to incumbency, liberalization of the political system requires
not only competition, but also a relatively autonomous economy to sustain
liberalization prospects. The findings contribute to the literature on electoral
authoritarianism, subnational democratization and China’s grassroots elections.
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Introduction
In liberal democracies, incumbents enjoy advantages in their re-election campaign
which can be structural – the control they have of the playing field – or communica-
tional – their experience and skill in using language, argument and recognition.1 Yet,
authoritarian elections have a different logic. They are instruments of authoritarian
rule, and thus give incumbents considerable power and tools to hollow out the demo-
cratic heart of electoral contestation to remain in power.2 In single-party authoritarian
regimes where opposition is not allowed to organize into parties, incumbent advantage
can well turn into incumbent dominance. Village elections in China are such a form of
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political contestation in which candidates who are not members of the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) are not allowed to organize into political parties and can only run
as individuals. Moreover, as local governments emphasize leadership stability in rural
governance and policy implementation, incumbent village leaders enjoy considerable
advantage in their re-election and may even dominate electoral outcomes.
How should we interpret the incidence of incumbent turnover under a heavily
skewed system in favour of incumbents? As Dahl proposed, democracy consists of
two dimensions, contestation and inclusiveness.3 ‘Contestation’ means the extent of
opposition and competition permitted in the political system, while ‘inclusiveness’ indi-
cates the proportion of the population entitled to participate in the system of public
contestation. For elections to be considered contested and inclusive, they need to
have a reasonable turnover rate and a contestation open to the public. Thus, incumbent
turnover indicates contestation, while successful challenge to incumbency by opposi-
tion outside the ruling party represents a shift towards inclusiveness. In practice, incum-
bent turnover does not indicate democratization, because the successor may be
handpicked by or closely associated with the former ruler or may be even stronger
and more authoritarian than the incumbent stepping down.4 But a successful challenge
to incumbency certainly brings uncertainty to the contestation and raises challengers’
expectation about possible electoral victory in the future.
What economic factors can break incumbent dominance in electoral competition
without parties? Using electoral data and case study of villages in a county of Guang-
dong Province in China, with the pseudonym of Liyuan County, this article offers an
explanation of why incumbents dominate in some villages but fail in others.5 The
results demonstrate that economic development, as is evident in democratization litera-
ture, increases substantially the chance of successful challenges to incumbency,
especially by non-party challengers; equally important is another economic condition,
a more industrial economic structure, which weakens the economic leverage possessed
by authoritarian subnational governments to intervene in electoral contestation and
manipulate the outcome.
There are two contributions in this article. First, this article is among the first to
bring together the experience of China’s local elections and existing studies on subna-
tional authoritarianism. Despite growing literature on subnational politics and existing
literature in the field of Chinese village elections, experience from China’s village elec-
tions has not been well incorporated into the literature on subnational authoritarianism.
The rise of scholarly attention to subnational democratization is an outcome of the
third-wave democratization whereby national democratization transforming politics
at the national level creates little pressure for subnational democratization and in
some cases leaves subnational authoritarianism intact.6 China is the opposite combi-
nation, being nationally authoritarian while limited contestation of power has been
introduced at the subnational levels. China’s combination of limited subnational
democracy under a nationally authoritarian regime is equally important to our under-
standing of subnational politics. Moreover, local elections without party competition in
the context of single-party authoritarian regimes are quite often considered to be
window dressing without any implication for the stability and durability of regimes.
Yet, even when competition is structured to the benefit of pro-regime candidates and
very poorly conducted, the provision of even limited choices can simultaneously
strengthen demands for accountability and loyalty to the regime.7
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Second, this article contributes to existing literature on China’s village elections in
that it is the first to treat electoral outcome as a key indicator of the contestation and
inclusiveness of village elections. Existing studies of China’s village elections have exam-
ined in great detail the variation in procedural quality of the elections, and focused on
the degree to which village elections are competitive, that is, with multiple candidates
standing for each office or electoral procedure fulfilling standards of liberal democracy,
such as secret balloting, one-man-one-vote and fair and transparent ballot counting.
However, procedural measurement of village elections, as important as it was, can no
longer differentiate the more democratic elections from less democratic ones. For
one thing, village elections have been largely standardized since 1998. Moreover,
through years of practice local governments have learned how to fake compliance
with election regulations and laws.8 In addition, recent studies of the regime sustainabil-
ity of CCP rule demonstrate that the Chinese cultural concept of democracy as “guar-
dianship” and the continuing efforts of the CCP to rely on mass mobilization to sustain
regime support have weakened the role of formal political institutions and procedures
such as elections and civil organizations.9 The diminished role of elections suggests that
the focus of village election study should move away from the formal electoral insti-
tutions to more subtle authoritarian domination, that is, focus on electoral outcomes.
This article proceeds as follows. I begin with a discussion of incumbent advantages in
China’s village elections. Section three develops hypotheses for statistical analysis based
on the literature on both competitive authoritarianism and China’s village elections.
The article then proceeds to research design and variable operationalization. Section
five presents the statistical results and section six demonstrates how a successful chal-
lenge to incumbency works, using a case study of a village. Finally, the article concludes
with political implications of the findings.
Incumbent advantage in China’s village elections
Rural residents in China get to choose their leaders at the ballot box. Holding competi-
tive village elections every three years has become mandatory nationwide in 1998 since
the promulgation of the Organic Law of Village Committee. Each village committee
(VC) normally consists of three to seven members and is headed by a chairman. VCs
are responsible for managing village collective resources and specific issues within vil-
lages, including, but not limited to, mediating disputes, maintaining social order, pro-
viding public goods and developing the village economy.
The 1998 law stipulates that VCs are organs of self-government whereby villagers
select and supervise their leaders and decide and manage their own issues. Candidates
should be directly nominated by eligible villagers, and all eligible villagers can vote and
run for office in the villages they reside in. Elections must be competitive in that the
number of candidates running for office should exceed the number of positions avail-
able on the VC. An election is valid only if the two majorities – at least 50% voter
turnout and at least 50% votes of the turnout received by the winner – are met. If no
candidate fulfils these two majorities, the top few candidates with the most votes are
selected as the official candidates, and a run-off election will be held to decide the
winner.10
Yet, VCs are not independent kingdoms; instead, they are nested within China’s one-
party system and subject to the manipulation of local governments and grassroots party
organizations. On the one hand, according to the law, township governments are
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assigned the duty of implementing and supervising village elections and the CCP’s
grassroots organizations – village party committees (VPC) – should exercise leadership
over VCs on important matters.11 In practice, this requirement offers local governments
the de jure power to directly intervene in local elections and influence the election
results. On the other hand, according to the law, VCs should also support the township
governments in carrying out state policies and political tasks. The political careers of
township officials depend on meeting performance targets. Thus, if township officials
expect that the electoral outcomes will hinder their implementation of performance
targets and affect their political career, they are incentivized to adjust the implemen-
tation of village elections and fake compliance with the law.12
In China’s village elections, the key goal for local governments to secure domination
is the election of experienced incumbents, because they have a better understanding of
the implementation of performance targets crucial to the political careers of upper-level
officials. Local officials are assessed based on their performance on a range of perform-
ance targets ranked according to level of importance.13 Compared with new candidates,
incumbents with experience of collaborating with township officials have a better
understanding of the importance of these performance targets and their implemen-
tation. Uncertainty associated with new leadership in rural villages is a risk that rural
township officials prefer to avoid when it comes to implementing priority targets.
This preference is clearly spelled out in the fifth village election implementation plan
issued by Liyuan County government, which states that in order to maintain leadership
stability in rural areas, township governments and VPCs should strive to keep the
majority of village incumbents re-elected.14
Incumbents also have a great incentive to run for re-election, as selective incentives
are provided by the central government to maintain rural leadership stability. In a series
of policies, the central government has called for recruiting incumbents with an excel-
lent performance during their tenure to join the party and giving priority to grassroots
officials working at the VC and VPC in the recruitment of township officials, especially
VC chairmen and village party secretaries.15 In Liyuan County, in recruiting township
officials, priority is given to candidates who have served in the VC or VPC for at least
three terms, especially village party secretaries and VC chairmen.16 For incumbents,
especially those who want to climb up the political ladder, the possibility of political
advancement provides strong incentive to seek re-election and accumulate necessary
political capital.
Explaining the variation in incumbent re-election in authoritarian
elections: theories and arguments
In studies of authoritarian elections, scholars have explored what economic factors
explain the variation in electoral authoritarianism at both national and subnational
levels.17 In this section, two factors commonly discussed in the literature – economic
development and structure – are introduced in more detail, followed by a discussion
of controls for alternative explanations.
Economic development
In democratization literature, economic development is identified as a key factor affect-
ing the development and consolidation of democracy, as increased wealth is often
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associated with structural conditions, such as a better-educated population, an empow-
ered working class, enlarging size of the middle class, income equality, a diversified
economy and industrialization.18 Yet, in competitive authoritarian regimes, economic
growth may have a different effect. It can increase the amount of resources available
to incumbents for patronage and public-sector salaries, allowing authoritarian incum-
bents to maintain their hold on power and strengthen their governance legitimacy.19
Scholars of China also explore the effect of economic development on village elections,
but with different underlying mechanisms. Hu finds that village economic wealth
increases the stake villagers have in the election and the rewards candidates obtain
from the results of the election, thus greater participation by villagers in elections
and more intense electoral competition are witnessed in more economically developed
villages.20 Oi and Rozelle, and Shi find a somewhat negative relationship between econ-
omic development and competitive village elections.21 However, in their studies, econ-
omic development is a proxy for village economic structure and thus their studies are
discussed in the next section on economic structure.
Studies of China’s local elections do not emphasize selective incentives, such as the
spoils of office, because local officials have limited access to state patronage.22 Yet, the
selective benefits can be financial rewards candidates can receive from holding village
office, because VCs have control over collective village resources. In addition, selective
benefits can also include political advancement from village positions to positions in the
township government. Given that economic targets are one crucial criterion for the
career advancement of local officials, elected officials in economically well-developed
villages have a higher chance of being recruited to township governments. Thus, I
expect to find a negative relationship between village economic wealth and incumbent
dominance, because village economic wealth incentivizes candidates to join the electoral
competition and increases electoral competitiveness.
Economic structure
In the study of local democracy, local economic structure emerges as a crucial local con-
textual factor shaping the development of local democracy. In competitive authoritarian
regimes or poor democracies, local economic opportunities are quite often monopo-
lized by local governments or locally based individuals, families, clans, cliques or organ-
izations, leaving very limited space for opposition activities and giving rise to
subnational authoritarianism.23 If economic well-being and livelihoods of most of the
population are dependent on the state, voters tend to support candidates who are
endorsed by incumbent elites and opposition forces tend to be coopted in order to
maintain power and enjoy the benefits and patronage of holding onto power.24
Without economic autonomy – opportunities for jobs beyond the reach of local govern-
ment – citizens and opponents do not have the economic means to protect themselves
from governmental harassment in organizing and attending civic activities and are thus
less likely to challenge local authorities.25 For example, revenue centralization in Mexico
provides the PRI – the Institutional Revolutionary Party – an important economic tool
to threaten localities in support of the opposition and achieve dominance in the elec-
toral outcome.26
Similarly, in China’s village elections, electoral participation and competition are
heavily shaped by village economic structure. Some scholars demonstrate a negative
relationship between economic development and competitive village elections and in
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their accounts economic development is a proxy for economic structure. Shi demon-
strates that rapid economic development provides incumbent village leaders incentive
and financial resources to coopt voters and hold controlled elections that will guarantee
their vested interests in the village.27 Oi and Rozelle propose a two-dimension conti-
nuum to measure village economic structure, one capturing the source of villagers’
income and the other measuring the composition of village wealth on the agricul-
tural–industrial axis.28 Village leaders in industrial villages have more to lose than
their counterparts in agricultural villages and thus have a greater incentive to limit par-
ticipation. Thus, less competitive village elections are observed in industrial villages and
villages with rapid economic development. The key mechanism is the motivation and
capability of village leaders to limit participation and hold onto power, and thus the
analysis focuses on the village level.
However, I argue that, compared with village incumbent leaders, the township gov-
ernment has considerably more leverage in electoral competition and thus township
economic structure plays a major role in incumbent dominance. As mentioned
earlier, township governments have the de jure power to directly intervene in local elec-
tions and influence the election results if they see fit. They may also have the de facto
power to control village elections, because township governments may possess econ-
omic resources crucial to the development of the village economy, especially in less
developed agricultural areas.
In industrial areas, external sources for village collective income can be rents for
commercial and industrial premises paid by businessmen, fees paid by companies
setting up their own business in the village or fees paid by outside contractors according
to their particular business.29 Township–village enterprises (TVE) and village collective
enterprises are more common in villages of industrial areas. However, in agricultural
areas and most inland provinces of China, township governments were not very suc-
cessful in developing TVEs before the mid-1990s; and they subsequently restructured
and privatized TVEs, if there were any, retreating to focusing on their public function.30
For these villages, the networks and resources possessed by township governments are
crucial to development. As part of the village poverty relief programme, local govern-
ments are also encouraged to introduce outside investment into poor villages in agricul-
tural areas and to help them develop their economy.31 In Guangdong Province, for
example, rural township and county governments select villages for a provincial invest-
ment programme that connects villages to outside investors, such as branches of com-
mercial or state-owned banks, telecommunication companies and government sectors
in cities of the Pearl River Delta.32 The key goal of this programme is to provide finan-
cial assistance and develop village economies. Thus, in agricultural areas, township gov-
ernments have considerably greater economic leverage in influencing electoral
competition than their counterparts in relatively industrialized areas. Hence, I argue
that villages in industrial towns with lower farming population are more likely to
break incumbent dominance, because township governments have less economic lever-
age to dominate elections.
Controls for alternative explanations
Incumbent advantage in authoritarian elections may be influenced by a number of other
factors, most importantly an incumbent’s party connection. Much of the literature on
authoritarian elections focuses on how opposition can form coalitions to compete with
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the authoritarian incumbents and point to the importance of opposition strategy.33 Yet,
in single-party regimes like China where opposition cannot organize into political
parties, the organizational strength of the incumbents is crucial to understanding elec-
toral competition. At the national level, strong states and governing parties are often
able to prevent elite defection, thwart opposition challenge and coopt or deny resources
to opponents.34
Turning to grassroots elections in China: the organizational power of the village
incumbent hinges on their connection to the CCP. Party membership is proven to be
one dominant pathway to candidacy in village elections, though it does not guarantee
electoral victory.35 Being a member at the CCP’s local organization, the VPC, can
provide incumbents with the power and party resources to win the electoral compe-
tition. For one thing, party connection may help incumbents to mobilize support in
local elections. As Tang argues, the current Chinese system is a populist authoritarian
regime in which the CCP relies on the use of the mass line ideology to generate public
support.36 The key of the mass line ideology is to mobilize the masses in political par-
ticipation and create direct interaction between state and society, generating a high level
of support for the CCP regime, especially the central government. Applying this popu-
list authoritarianism concept to grassroots elections would suggest that the VPCs are
granted the responsibility and duty to mobilize support for candidates handpicked by
local governments. For example, in the village election implementation plan of
Liyuan County, township and village party committees are requested to educate the
masses on exercising democratic rights, mobilize the masses to participate in voting
and guide the masses to pick qualified candidates in elections.37 The VPC is also
given the de jure power to influence the electoral competition. According to the law,
the VPC is required to exercise leadership in both elections and post-election govern-
ance.38 Village and township party committees can also nominate candidates and use
the party’s organization network to campaign for their candidates. Thus, I expect
that the party connection of the incumbent increases their chance of re-election.
In China’s village elections, incumbent re-election may be influenced by a number of
other individual-level and village-level factors. At the individual level, VCs are still
dominated by men.39 The CCP and local governments count on young and educated
villagers to vote and participate in village politics, on the one hand, and are keen on
socializing and coopting the best-educated youth into the party, on the other hand.40
Thus, educated, younger and male incumbents may have a higher chance of being
re-elected.
At the village level, remoteness – the distance of a village to the county seat – tests the
extent of political control by local officials. Earlier studies argue that local officials play a
major role in introducing semi-competitive village elections and those closer to county
seat should be more likely to have semi-competitive elections; while Shi found the oppo-
site effect – that the further a village is away from the county seat, the more likely that
elections in the village will be semi-competitive.41 If local officials play a major role in
facilitating incumbent re-election, there should be a negative relationship between
remoteness and the likelihood of an incumbent being re-elected. Village population
may also have an effect on incumbent re-election, as voting is essentially a collective
action. In China’s villages, the size of villages can range from a few hundred people
to tens of thousands.42 Challengers in villages with larger populations may require
more effort and resources to mobilize popular support, making it harder to win the elec-
tions. Inequality, as has been well documented in modernization literature, may affect
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regime transition and stability, while in China’s village elections, inequality, indicated
by the percentage of villagers relying on poverty relief subsidies from the government,
represents incumbents’ economic performance. A high inequality rate may well dimin-
ish the competitive advantage enjoyed by incumbents in elections.
As for the effect of local clans, in Liyuan County a common characteristic shared by
all villages is the existence of lineage groups. It is embodied in the local culture in the
way that people group together under a common ancestor and each village has one
ancestral hall for holding ceremonies on a few fixed dates of the year to worship the
common ancestor. Thus, there is limited variation among villages in the number and
the fragmentation of local clans. Finally, concerning the township leaders’ attitudes
towards incumbent re-election, re-election rate is one key measure of the performance
of township leaders on the implementation of village elections and each township gov-
ernment is required to report this figure back to the county government in Liyuan
County. Thus, township leaders’ preference towards incumbents are unlikely to differ
substantially in Liyuan County.
In order to tease out the effects of these controls on incumbent re-election, I con-
trolled for the incumbent’s party connection, age, gender and education at the individ-
ual level, and population, remoteness and percentage of poor at the village level.
Research design and variable operationalization
To understand the factors associated with incumbent re-election and the dynamics of
electoral competition in China’s village elections, I adopt a mixed methods approach.
Enquiry about the dynamics of political competition in village elections is considered
politically sensitive by local officials in China and it requires networks and trust to
gain access to local governments. A rural county in Guangdong Province – Liyuan
County – is thus selected. I worked as an observer of village elections in the Liyuan
County Civil Affair Bureau responsible for supervising village elections for three
months in the election year of 2008, which helped me to establish the networks and
trust essential for an in-depth study of the electoral dynamics. In addition, within
Liyuan County, there is variation among villages at the village level regarding economic
wealth, township economic structure, individual incumbents’ social demographic
characteristics and village demographic characteristics, a fact that serves the research
purpose of this article.
Although the findings are based on one county and may not be applicable to other
places within China, Liyuan County does represent the general and average situation of
China’s inland rural counties. Despite being located in Guangdong – one of the most
economically developed and industrialized provinces of China – Liyuan is a typical
non-coastal agricultural county like other rural counties in inland provinces of
China. In Liyuan County, 84.67% of the total population work in agriculture. In
terms of per capita annual net income of rural households, Liyuan County is in the
lower quantile in Guangdong and thus closer to the national average. In 2006, the
national average was ¥3587.04, while the average of Liyuan County was ¥3987.43
I did extensive fieldwork in Liyuan for about 18 months between 2008 and 2011 and
collected both quantitative data and qualitative evidence from interviews. The quanti-
tative data consist of results of two election cycles held in 2008 and 2011 and village
economic and demographic data of 237 villages in the 15 townships of the county.44
In the case study section, Centre Village was selected to demonstrate how successful
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challenges to incumbency work. Various actors, including previous VC chairmen and
members and county and township government officials, were interviewed to gather
information about electoral competition in Centre Village in previous elections since
2005.
In terms of the sample for the regression analysis in this article, the sample includes
only data on incumbents. The local governments do not collect detailed information of
all candidates running for village elections; instead, they collect and store detailed infor-
mation of elected VC chairmen and members in each election year. By comparing the
list of elected VCs over two election years, I can identify re-elected incumbents and suc-
cessors to those incumbents who failed to be re-elected. In China’s village elections,
incumbent re-election rate is a key quantifiable indicator that can be used to assess
local governments’ performance in the implementation of village elections, and thus
in practice incumbent VC chairmen are always considered candidates in electoral com-
petition.45 Local governments emphasize the re-election of the head position in VCs,
thus the regression analysis focuses on the re-election of VC chairmen. Before
moving to the statistical results, I shall introduce how variables are operationalized.
Dependent variables
The analysis examines the variation in incumbent re-elections in China’s village elec-
tions. I collected information about VC chairmen elected in 2008 and in 2011 in the
sample county, including their gender, education, age, party affiliation and connection
with the VPC. By comparing election results in 2008 and 2011, I can identity re-elected
incumbents and successors to those incumbents who failed to be re-elected in 2011.
There are two types of dependent variables in the regression analysis capturing two
dimensions of democracy proposed by Dahl, contestation and inclusiveness.46 Con-
testation and inclusiveness in the Chinese context mean that incumbents should face
not only the possibility of being replaced but also the possibility of being replaced by
non-party-member challengers. Among the 237 incumbent chairmen elected in 2008,
50% were re-elected to the chairman position in 2011, a reasonable turnover rate
even compared with the turnover rate in liberal democracies. Yet, among the 50%
incumbent VC chairmen who were not re-elected, 56% were replaced by party
members and 44% were replaced by non-party-member challengers. The first depen-
dent variable is a dummy variable – whether the VC chairmen elected in 2008 was
re-elected in 2011 – as a proxy of contestation and binary logistic regression is used
to analyse the data. The second dependent variable is a categorical one – whether the
VC chairmen elected in 2008 was re-elected, replaced by a party member or replaced
by a non-party outsider in 2011 – as a proxy of inclusiveness and multinomial logistic
regression is used with an incumbent being replaced by a non-party candidate as the
base outcome.
Independent variables
To capture the lucrative benefit associated with the VC head position, I measure village
wealth using the log transformation of village collective business wealth generated
through the business activities of the VCs in the first six months of 2011. In 2011,
village elections in Liyuan were held between March and June. Business revenue
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generated in the months close to elections should have a very strong signalling effect on
potential candidates’ decision to join the competition.
Similarly to Oi and Rozelle, I also measure economic structure on the agricultural–
industrial axis;47 but I apply this axis at the township level and use the percentage of
farming population at the township level to proxy the extent to which villages rely
on township governments for economic development. A high percentage of township
farming population indicates that agriculture remains the core source of village collec-
tive revenue and villages remain largely reliant on township governments’ financial and
policy support to generate collective wealth, offering local governments considerable
economic leverage to manipulate the elections. The most updated figure before the
2011 village elections was calculated in 2008 and from 2008 to 2011 there was no
major restructuring and development programme in the county which would have
changed this figure dramatically.
Control variables
All regression models additionally controlled for the incumbent’s party connection, age,
age squared, gender and education at the individual level, and population, remoteness
and percentage of poor at the village level. Both the CCP’s mass mobilization strategy
and the elections law have given the VPC networks, resources and de jure power to
mobilize support in elections, and thus I use the incumbent’s VPC membership in
2008, percentage of village party members and incumbent’s CCP membership prior
to the election in 2011 to proxy the incumbent’s party connection and access to
party organizational resources. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics.
Statistical results and discussion
Table 2 shows the coefficients (likelihood estimates). In model 1 with the dummy
dependent variable of whether the incumbent chairman was re-elected in 2011,
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
N Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Re-election 237 0.50 0.50 0 1
Incumbent replacement* 237 1.28 0.80 0 2
Township farming population percentage 237 86.67 11.43 58.61 96.14
Log10 (village business wealth + 1) 237 2.74 1.90 0 5.57
Village business wealth 237 17966.11 47973.01 0 371,050
VPC member in 2008 237 0.18 0.38 0 1
Percentage of village party members 237 2.00 0.72 0.93 4.72
CCP membership 237 0.87 0.34 0 1
Male 237 0.99 0.11 0 1
Education** 237 3.10 1.06 1 5
Age 237 52.96 7.79 30 71
Age squared 237 2864.97 797.07 900 5041
Population 237 2343.59 1626.96 399 10,321
Remoteness (km) 237 26.96 16.08 0.78 58.39
Percentage of poor 237 6.49 3.98 0 23.97
* For incumbent replacement, 0 indicates an incumbent being replaced by a non-party challenger, 1 an incumbent
being replaced by a party member and 2 an incumbent being re-elected.
** For education, 1 indicates primary schooling, 2 junior high schooling, 3 technical schooling or vocational school-
ing, 4 senior high schooling and 5 college or university or above.
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economic wealth has a statistically significant negative effect on incumbent re-election.
Villages in towns with higher farming population – more agricultural economic struc-
ture – are more likely to have incumbents re-elected, significant at the 0.05 level.
In order to compare the relative strength of the independent variables, Figure 1
shows the change in expected probability of incumbent re-election in model 1 when
each continuous independent variable increases by one standard deviation from its
mean and each dichotomous variable changes from 0 to 1 while all other variables
are held constant at their mean. In the figure, the average expected probability is high-
lighted along with the associated confidence intervals at the 0.1 level.48 As Figure 1 illus-
trates, one standard deviation increase from the mean in village business wealth
decreases the re-election of incumbents by 8%. One standard deviation increase from
the mean in township farming population percentage increases the re-election of
incumbents by 9%. These results support the arguments. Village business wealth
incentivizes candidates to enter the electoral competition, thus making it harder for
incumbents to be re-elected, while in agricultural towns incumbents are more likely
to be re-elected given villages’ economic dependency on township governments.
Table 2. Explaining incumbent re-election and replacement.
Logistic models Multinomial logistic models
1 2
Base outcome Not re-elected
An incumbent being replaced by a non-party
candidate
Dependent variable Re-elected Re-elected Replaced by party members
Independent variables















































































Pseudo R2 0.09 0.10
Log pseudo likelihood −149.12 −221.24
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Because the incumbent’s party connection and access to party organizational
resources are important control variables, Figure 1 also indicates their effects on the
probability of incumbent re-election. Holding VPC posts makes incumbents 25%
more likely to be re-elected, significant at the 0.01 level, while the size of the party
network and the party affiliation of the incumbent have no statistically significant
effect on incumbent re-election. This is consistent with the empirical findings from a
household survey in a rural county of Yunnan Province by Landry, Davis and Wang
that party membership did not guarantee electoral victory.49 Taking this further, the
findings of this article suggest that party membership of the incumbent and size of
village party network do not guarantee incumbent re-election, but sitting in the VPC
does increase incumbent advantage substantially and may well enable incumbents to
dominate electoral outcome.
Model 2 in Table 1 tests the inclusiveness dimension of village elections with an
incumbent being replaced by a non-party candidate as the base outcome.50 The key
focus is incumbent re-election vis-à-vis successful challenge by non-party candidates.
Similar patterns are observed. In model 2, holding all other variables constant, one stan-
dard deviation increase from the mean in village wealth increases the probability of suc-
cessful challenge by non-party candidates from 20% to 25% but decreases the
probability of incumbent re-election from 52% to 44%. Similarly, one standard devi-
ation increase from the mean in township farming population decreases the probability
of a successful challenge by non-party candidates by 5% and increases the probability of
incumbent re-election by 7%. In other words, the odds of a successful challenge by non-
party candidates in comparison with incumbent re-election are higher in wealthier vil-
lages and in villages of industrial towns with a lower farming population percentage. In
addition, among party connection variables, being a VPC member decreases
Figure 1. Change in expected probability of incumbent re-election.
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substantially the probability of a successful challenge to incumbency by non-party can-
didates by 13%.
The regression results show that increasing village wealth and more industrial town-
ship economic structure not only decrease the probability of incumbent re-election, but
also increase the probability of successful challenge to incumbency by non-party candi-
dates. These results support the arguments. Village wealth incentivizes candidates,
especially non-party candidates, to run for electoral competition, increasing the diffi-
culty of incumbent re-election. In industrial towns with lower farming population
where villages have more independent sources of collective revenue, local governments
have lost important economic leverage to intervene in electoral competition and thus
incumbents are more likely not only to fail to be re-elected but also to be replaced by
non-party challengers. These mechanisms behind the relationship between economic
factors and incumbent re-election are illustrated by a case study of a village in
Liyuan County in the next section.
Centre village: a successful case of challenge to incumbency
In this section, I illustrate how a successful challenge to incumbency works. Centre
Village experienced fierce electoral competition and successful challenges to incum-
bency in the three elections since 2005.51 In the three election years of 2005, 2008
and 2011, all incumbent VC chairmen were not party members; all ran for re-election
campaign but failed to be re-elected; and all were replaced by non-party challengers. A
close look at the dynamics of electoral competition in this village reveals the strategies
used by both challengers and incumbents and demonstrates how economic factors
affect the effectiveness of these strategies.
Centre Village is one of the wealthiest villages in terms of the amount of collective
village resources possessed by the VC. In the early 2000s, there was major urbanization
and industrial development in the county centre. During the early stage of this devel-
opment, the VC of Centre Village generated a large amount of revenue through selling
collective lands to both the county government and outside investors. Since major con-
struction of the industrial development was completed in 2008, the VC has relied
financially on subletting collective lands and properties.52 Possessing wealthy land
and property resources provides strong selective incentives for candidates to join
the electoral competition in Centre Village. The potential lucrative benefits one can
pocket from the collective revenue is one lure for candidates to enter the electoral
competition. Further, because the VC has direct contacts with various outside inves-
tors when utilizing village collective resources, holding VC offices can also help the
officer-holders to accumulate network resources for their own business interests.
Third, if a candidate can be continuously elected to the VC chairman position for
three terms and given that Centre Village is one of the most developed villages in
the county, the candidate will be given priority in the recruitment of township govern-
ment officials. Potential rewards, either financial or political, attract challengers from
both within and outside the CCP to compete for the VC chairman position in Centre
Village, increasing the difficulty for the local government to achieve incumbent
dominance.
Lucrative potential rewards make challengers resort to vote-buying practices. Vote-
buying has been prevalent in Centre Village’s past electoral competition. In 2005, the
competition between different groups led to a fight causing one death and several
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injuries. In 2008, a non-party challenger was elected after spending around ¥500,000
(US$81,967.21) on buying votes and villagers who voted for him received ¥100 (US
$16.39) per ballot ticket.53 In 2011, the incumbent VC chairman elected in 2008
sought re-election. However, a non-party challenger won the VC chair position after
spending some money on vote-buying.54 It is stated explicitly in the Guangdong Pro-
vincial internal policy documents that vote-buying and voter intimidation are strictly
prohibited. Yet, in practice, to prove a candidate guilty of vote bribery or voter intimi-
dation requires solid and direct evidence, which is difficult to obtain.55 Local govern-
ments cannot engage in similar vote-buying practice to outbid the challengers,
because it is prohibited in the provincial policy documents to do so and the local gov-
ernment does not have the financial resources to engage in vote-buying.
For a local government, a cost-effective mechanism to achieve incumbent re-election
is to rely on the economic leverage they have over village economic development. If vil-
lages rely on local governments to introduce economic development opportunities,
local governments have considerable power to persuade or even threaten challengers
to drop out of the electoral competition. Yet, this proves ineffective in villages of indus-
trial townships. As a village party secretary has revealed,56
In those industrial towns with more private economic opportunities, it is very difficult to guide
the elections towards local government’s intention, because these villages have their own devel-
opment sources and they are not afraid of local government. They don’t count on the local gov-
ernment for any economic support and they also don’t worry that their economic gains might be
damaged if they don’t follow the instructions from local governments.
Centre Village is such a village with independent opportunities for economic develop-
ment. It is in the most industrial township of the county – Factory Town – and the
township has a farming population of 58.61%. As part of the urbanization and indus-
trial development in the county centre since 2000, Factory Town has attracted many
outside investors to seek for investment opportunities. It boasts a big industrial park
with about thirty factories, which produce various products, such as audio, HiFi, car
accessories and pharmaceutical products. Being in an industrial township provides
Centre Village various opportunities to generate collective resource. Local governments
are just one among many other development options.57 Relatively independent oppor-
tunities for economic development make it difficult for both the county and township
governments to manipulate the electoral outcomes in Centre Village.
Conclusion
Local elections without partisan competition in single-party authoritarian regimes
provide considerable advantages to the incumbents and may well turn incumbent
advantage common in liberal democracies into incumbent dominance. This article
illustrates, with evidence from grassroots elections in China, that economic wealth
can provide substantial selective incentives and lucrative benefits to attract competitors,
while a more industrial economic structure, providing villages with independent econ-
omic development opportunities, weakens the economic leverage possessed by local
governments to intervene in electoral competition and manipulate the outcome.
Thus, growing economic wealth and decreasing farming population are likely to
break incumbent dominance and increase the probability of successful challenges to
incumbency by candidates from outside the CCP. The case study further demonstrates
that lucrative benefits incentivize candidates to engage in vote-buying, while industrial
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economic structure has made local governments lose the important economic leverage
they have to persuade or even threaten challengers to drop out of the electoral compe-
tition, thus giving rise to successful challenges to incumbency.
Given the importance of the CCP’s mass mobilization strategy and rule in China, the
regression analyses also control for the incumbent’s party connection. Among these
variables, the article finds that party membership of the incumbent and size of
village party network do not affect incumbent re-election, but being a member of the
VPC – the party’s grassroots organization – does substantially increase the probability
of incumbent re-election. This may be related to the leadership status of the VPC in
grassroots villages. This suggests that an effective strategy for incumbents to remain
in power is to sit in the VPC. In order to be a member of the VPC, one needs to be
a CCP member; and thus for non-party-member incumbents to maintain power,
being coopted into the party and becoming a VPC member is a very attractive
option. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss elite cooptation in China’s
village elections. Future research can probe further in this direction, for example, the
impact of elite cooptation on intra-party democracy starting from the grassroots levels.
The findings need to be examined in a broader Chinese context in order to under-
stand the political implications. Competitive elections are only introduced in rural vil-
lages in China where the local economic structure is predominantly agricultural. In the
majority of these areas, key economic resources are controlled by the local government
and thus elections serve to guarantee incumbent advantage or even dominance most of
the time. Yet, in recent decades, China has experienced rapid urbanization, which may
break local governments’ monopoly over economic resources, thus bringing more suc-
cessful challenges to incumbency in Chinese grassroots elections. I suspect that such a
positive prospect, involving the urbanization of the suburban rural villages, may lead to
rural villages being absorbed into cities, where direct election for the governance body
will no longer be applicable. This transformation happened to an urbanized county
neighbouring Liyuan and in cities in the Pearl River Delta, which I observed in 2008.
This suggests that it is unlikely that village elections will bring genuine democratization
in China, as these elections are mainly introduced in rural villages where economic con-
ditions strengthen party dominance, and governments can always rein in the potential
democratization effect of such reform in authoritarian regimes.
This leads to the last but in no way least important point, the logic of local democra-
tization in authoritarian regimes and the political implications of the findings beyond
China. Conventional wisdom considers local democratization a useful means to
provide local actors with more power and autonomy. Yet, as Bohlken has argued, in
the developing world local democratization is driven by the desire of government
elites to consolidate their power and monitor and discipline local elites.58 Village elec-
tions in China are such a type of local democratization from above, as commonly
observed in the developing world, especially in authoritarian regimes. Keeping this in
mind, it is not surprising to find that local elections are quite often introduced
without promoting local fiscal and economic autonomy. Without economic indepen-
dence, local elections will only serve as a mechanism of manipulation by the state,
rather than as “rule by the people”. This suggests that though we may observe successful
challenge to incumbency in local elections, liberalization of the political system requires
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